Israel: Coalition of the will(ing) to be in power

Israeli elections produce figures but rarely conclusive results, the real outcome of the elections is revealed only when a new coalition government is formed. Following nearly two months of what has become known as customary "horse trading" negotiations, Prime Minister Netanyahu will present his new government to the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset, on Monday. Israel’s 33rd government will consist of five parties supported by sixty-eight members of Knesset. One might argue that even the celebratory atmosphere of presenting the new government before the Knesset, will be unable to conceal that this ‘coalition of the willing’ contains from the outset many divisions regarding fundamental issues such as the peace process, policy towards Iran, the sharing of economic and social responsibilities, the Jewish character of the state and its approach to minorities. Hence they are mainly united by the desire of its members to be in power.

The election results of this January were probably one the most inconclusive in Israel’s political history. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s miscalculation in running as part of the Likud-Israel Beitenu joint list, an even a more hawkish party than his own, backfired in the ballot box. The joint political venture lost more than quarter of its seats parliament, leaving it with 31 seats out of 120 available.

Despite this poor result Netanyahu was the only party leader in a position to form a government, though with great difficulties, and ending with what he might regard as an unfavourable coalition composition. In the pursuit of building a coalition with a working majority it became quite quickly evident that Netanyahu had no alternative to Yesh Atid (There is Future), led by Yair Lapid, and the Jewish Home, led by Naftali Bennet with their respective 19 and 12 seats. Both are led by charismatic and relatively young though inexperienced leaders. Yet, they proved to be fast learners in the murky business of forming governments in Israel, recognizing swiftly that their best negotiation strategy was to present Netanyahu with no option than to have both of them or none of them. Hence, the process of forming the coalition was excruciating as the negotiators had no reason to concede too many demands, while for Netanyahu time was running out. Failing to form a government would have led to either someone else from another party being asked to form a government, or more likely calling fresh elections. Neither prospects were enticing for the Likud party and its leader.

The outcome is a coalition with a comfortable majority and a potentially radical domestic agenda. However, this is a government which leaves little room for optimism regarding the peace process with the Palestinians, an issue which seems to be sacrificed for the sake of forming a government.

For the first time in many years none of the ultra-Orthodox parties will be represented around the government table due largely to the demands of the axis of Lapid and Bennet. One of their major rallying cries during the elections was for the ultra-Orthodox to contribute a fairer share of the military service and economic burden, as they presently contribute far less than their proportion in the population suggests. Keeping Shas and Agudat Israel out of the coalition opened the door, if legislation is successful, for the conscription of young ultra-Orthodox that were thus far exempt from military service. Alternatively they will attend training programmes which will prepare them for entering into the job market. In the long run this might lead to the shortening of the military service for the rest of the population and reduce the need of the state to financially support ultra-Orthodox families. It is also suggested that Arab Israeli youth will increase the participation in civil service in exchange for state benefits similar to the ones granted to those who have served in the Israeli military.

The new government aims to also tackle political fragmentation by increasing the election threshold from 2 to 4 percent, consequently decreasing the number of parties in the Knesset. A quick glance at the results of the last elections reveals that this might badly hurt mainly the Arab parties, unless they find a way to unite forces. However, this may do very little to ease the agonizing process of forming a coalition in Israel, as the Arab parties are unfortunately customarily excluded from joining government with little prospect for this to change. Lapid’s ill-fated statement the day after the elections that he won’t co-operate with the Arab parties was not a mere declaration of political preference, but verged on a wholesale de-legitimization of the Arab minority in Israel.

For the outside observer, most puzzling is the lack of debate about peace with the Palestinians during the elections, and how little role it played in the coalition negotiations. Appointing Zipi Livni to head the diplomatic process with the Palestinians seemed like a positive development, considering her more compromising approach towards the peace process. However, the coalition agreement with the Jewish Home limits Livni’s power within the cabinet and also subjected any withdrawal from the occupied territories to a referendum. One can only imagine the incitement against any such withdrawal, if the history of the Oslo process is anything to go by. The reality is that there is no majority in this government to take the necessary steps needed to re-start the peace process, let alone to make the needed concessions to conclude it with a peace agreement. As the Middle East is fast changing this might have a crucial impact on the long term security of the state.

Now that the dust has settled on the coalition negotiations, the question remains whether this government is capable of functioning in some sort of modus Vivendi, enabling the formation and implementation of coherent policies. One might argue that divisions within the government will surface as soon as it has to deal with any major issue. The coalition agreement glosses over deep conceptual differences and personal ambitions. This puts the longevity and attainment of this government in doubt.

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Yossi Mekelberg is an Associate Fellow at the Middle East and North Africa Program at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, where he is involved with projects and advisory work on conflict resolution, including Track II negotiations. He is also the Director of the International Relations and Social Sciences Program at Regent’s College in London, where he has taught since 1996. Previously, he was teaching at King’s College London and Tel Aviv University. Mekelberg’s fields of interest are international relations theory, international politics of the Middle East, human rights, and international relations and revolutions. He is a member of the London Committee of Human Rights Watch, serving on the Advocacy and Outreach committee. Mekelberg is a regular contributor to the international media on a wide range of international issues and you can find him on Twitter @YMekelberg.