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The war with Iran has been ongoing for more than two years, sparked by Hamas’ attacks on October 7, 2023.

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After its regional arms were diminished, a fundamental question emerges about the ultimate goal of this war on Iran.

There appears to be American-Israeli agreement on starting the war, but each side seems to have its own vision for how it should end. Israel wants to topple the Iranian regime, while President Trump’s administration speaks of changing the leadership while preserving the structure of the system. In other words, the Venezuelan model. Another possibility is pushing Tehran to make strategic concessions, foremost among them ending domestic uranium enrichment.

As for Israel’s objectives, I discussed in my previous article the view of Daniel Levy, the Israeli political analyst, who believes Israel wants to topple the regime and fragment Iran into smaller states. He said this aligns with Israel’s regional vision of managing large regional powers.

Discussing these proposals requires pausing at a golden rule in dealing even with adversaries, one based on three pillars: preserving the unity of states, respecting their borders, and avoiding direct involvement in regime change.

Iran, like all major regional states, carries structural complexities that make any radical change a source of broad regional risks. Remember that the fall of the Shah and Khomeini’s rise to power in 1979 took place without a single shot being fired, and was seen as merely a limited and peaceful change, based on the assumption that there were established institutions such as the army and the civil state. But the few years that followed revealed that what happened in Tehran plunged the entire region into cycles of chaos and conflict.

Indeed, the idea of regime change in Tehran enjoys a degree of international acceptance, even if silent, including among European states, despite the distance between them and Washington over this war. Even Tehran’s allies are not enamored with its policies. Moscow is not fully aligned with Tehran on the nuclear file and supports external enrichment, while China opposes its regional behavior. However, both powers fear the installation of a pro-Washington regime, or a slide into subsequent chaos that could threaten their vital interests.

In theory, neighboring states may view the scenario of toppling the Iranian regime positively and believe its repercussions can be contained, by comparison with the experience of toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime, when conditions beyond the borders remained calm. But this argument lacks precision, because Iraq was controlled by around 200,000 American soldiers, a scenario that does not appear to be on the table in the Iranian case. Accordingly, the risks of change for the countries of the region are significant and could last for many years.

In the same context, talk of breaking up Iran and separatist proposals may appear politically suitable and comfortable for some parties, but they may carry tremendous risks.

Major powers have calculations that differ from those of regional states. The United States is a geographically distant superpower. It has the ability to change regimes and destroy states, and if its project fails, it can pack its bags and leave. The countries of the region cannot escape the legacy of crises and their
repercussions.

This does not mean avoiding involvement in influencing the internal situation, which is different from direct projects of change through hard power.

The reason Iran is being targeted today is that it itself did not respect the rules of the regional order, and it is responsible for what is happening to it.

The expansion of Tehran’s regime and its dominance over four Arab capitals led it to drag the Assad regime to its demise, weaken the Iraqi and Lebanese authorities, and fuel chaos and war in Yemen. As a result of these policies, Tehran now finds itself besieged and facing its most dangerous ordeal since the establishment of the republic.

Some ask: As long as the regime is threatened and in danger, why does it adopt hardline positions in negotiations instead of backing down? The reason is that it realizes making concessions abroad would weaken it domestically, threaten it with defections, and expose the system to collapse.

The regime believes that “steadfastness” against an external enemy is easier for it than confronting potential rebellions and revolution.

Read more:

Waiting or suicide: Iran’s choices narrow under Trump’s naval blockade

A greater Israel and a greater Iran