How Lebanon can dismantle Hezbollah without destroying itself

Lebanon is once again being asked the wrong question. The debate, as always, is framed around whether Hezbollah can be disarmed, as if the issue were purely technical, military, or even logistical. It is not. The real question is whether Lebanon is willing to behave like a state. Because Hezbollah’s power does not stem from the sophistication of its weapons, but from the weakness, and complicity, of the Lebanese state itself.

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The current moment is different. For the first time in years, the implicit rules of engagement have shifted. Since the ceasefire, Beirut has largely been spared direct Israeli targeting. No drones hovering above the capital, no assassinations in its southern suburbs. This is not a coincidence; it is a message. The battlefield, for now, is not Beirut. It is the idea of the Lebanese state.

And Hezbollah understands this perfectly.

Which is why its rhetoric has escalated, not against Israel, but against the Lebanese presidency. When Hezbollah invokes the assassinations of Anwar Sadat and Rafic Hariri, this is not political commentary; it is a threat. A deliberate attempt to intimidate President Joseph Aoun and anyone who dares to speak of state sovereignty. This is not resistance language; this is how organized crime communicates.

Yet here lies the paradox: by targeting the president, Hezbollah is not attacking a political opponent, it is attacking the last remaining symbol of the Lebanese state. And in doing so, it exposes its greatest weakness: it cannot coexist with a functioning state.

So how does one dismantle such a structure?

Not by storming neighborhoods, and certainly not by sending the Lebanese army door to door in search of hidden weapons. That is the fantasy Hezbollah wants its opponents to believe, because it guarantees civil war, which remains its ultimate insurance policy.
Instead, Lebanon must learn how to eat the elephant.

As the African proverb goes, you eat an elephant one bite at a time. Hezbollah is that elephant: too large, too entrenched, and too dangerous to confront head-on. But not immune to gradual, systematic erosion.

The first bite is institutional.

Hezbollah’s most dangerous weapon is not its arsenal; it is its infiltration of the state. From intelligence services to border control, from forged passports to security loopholes, the party’s influence within state institutions is what allows it to operate with impunity. Cleaning these institutions is not a secondary step; it is the foundation of any serious strategy. Officers loyal to Hezbollah, or worse, to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, must be removed. Not tomorrow, not symbolically, but decisively.

The second bite is political.

For years, Hezbollah has benefited from political cover, most notably from Speaker Nabih Berri. Berri’s role has been to normalize Hezbollah, to present it as just another political actor rather than an armed entity operating outside the state. This duality must end. Lebanese political forces, especially those who claim to oppose Hezbollah, must stop outsourcing responsibility. Silence is complicity, and ambiguity is surrender.

The third bite is national.

Hezbollah’s greatest shield is not military, it is sectarian. The party thrives on the narrative that it represents and protects Lebanon’s Shia community. Breaking this equation is essential. The Lebanese state must reclaim its role as the sole guarantor of all citizens, including, and especially, Shias. This is not about confrontation; it is about inclusion. When citizens feel protected by the state, they no longer need protection from militias.

The fourth bite is strategic.

The Lebanese army must do what it has long avoided: deploy visibly and consistently across the country, including in areas where Hezbollah has operated uncontested. This is not about confrontation, but about presence. A state that is absent cannot claim sovereignty. A state that hesitates invites substitution.
None of this will produce immediate results. And that is precisely the point.

There is no single moment where Hezbollah “falls.” No dramatic disarmament ceremony, no clean political transition. What there can be, however, is a gradual stripping away of its power, its legitimacy, its cover, its reach, until its weapons become politically irrelevant, and eventually, operationally unsustainable.
The alternative is far worse.

Hezbollah has made it clear that it is willing to threaten internal violence to protect its arsenal. It is betting that Lebanon, exhausted and divided, will choose paralysis over confrontation. That fear will once again triumph over responsibility.
But this moment offers a narrow window.

International pressure is aligning around a simple demand: a Lebanese state that controls its own territory. Even figures as controversial as Donald Trump have framed the issue in these terms, state sovereignty, monopoly over arms, adherence to the constitution. Strip away the theatrics, and the message is clear: Lebanon is being given a choice.

To remain a battlefield for others, or to become a state.

Eating the elephant is not easy. It requires patience, discipline, and above all, political courage. But it is the only path that avoids both surrender and self-destruction.

Lebanon does not need another war to get rid of Hezbollah.

It needs a state willing, finally, to exist.

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