The need to repair the Gulf front

The Arab Gulf states are facing security and existential challenges that may be greater than anything they have experienced before, including the Iran-Iraq War and the occupation of Kuwait. At that time, the world was clearer and more willing to take sides. Today, however, betting on alliances, agreements, or military technology alone is not enough.

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Iran’s systematic attacks against the six Gulf states will not end with the end of the war. They may, in fact, be only the beginning. These attacks are currently pushing the region toward further armament, the strengthening of self-defense capabilities, and the emergence of new axes.

Most likely, Iran’s war will be the last American war in the region. Since achieving oil self-sufficiency, Washington has wanted to leave. Obama began that shift, Biden spoke about it, and now Trump is seeking to pursue it.

One of the byproducts of this vacuum is the return of competing regional alliances and axes, such as Islamabad and Ankara. If the goal is to deter Iran and achieve balance in the region, are they capable of doing so? The Saudi-Pakistani agreement is bilateral, not an axis, and is based on military cooperation. Turkey is not eager to enter into a confrontation with Iran. It enjoys NATO’s umbrella and has a military relationship with the United States, and it will not allow its alliance to drag it into a confrontation with Tehran.

Iran, whose direction under its new leadership cannot yet be judged, will push the Gulf states toward cooperation with Israel if it continues its aggressive policy. We must not forget that Iran was the reason the US Fifth Fleet came to the Gulf for the first time, when it targeted oil tankers. Its threats have also been behind the proliferation of foreign military bases and agreements.

In the war crisis that has unfolded since last February, there is a complex regional triangle of conflict: Iran, the Gulf, and Israel. Because of Iran’s continued attacks on the Gulf states, they in turn will seek to create a new deterrence system to fill the vacuum, in the event that the United States signs a non-aggression agreement with Tehran.

We cannot judge Iran’s intentions unless it matches words with actions. Will it end its “pincer” strategy, which is based on threatening the security of the Gulf states from the north and the south? This would require it to abandon its militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen.

In this war, Iran has resorted to taking revenge on the Gulf states every time it is unable to confront Israel in Lebanon, or fears responding to the United States in Gulf waters. This is what may push the Gulf states to ally themselves even with the devil.

Iranian attacks have helped bring the members of the Gulf grouping closer together and reduce their differences, but they have not ended them. As the Iranian threat against them grows, and perhaps increases further after the war, they will find themselves forced to rebuild their front to repel the Iranian danger.
What is driving this skeptical and cautious thinking? Do the Gulf states fear that the Iranians and Americans will reach an agreement at their expense? It is unlikely that the negotiations contain anything Washington could concede against them. More likely, Iranian negotiators will seek to reassure the Gulf that Tehran does not intend to target them after the war ends. Under the new reality, Iran will seek to compensate for its major regional losses, perhaps by adopting a compensatory policy for Lebanon and Syria.

We can see this compensatory positioning in Tehran’s insistence on extending its control over the Strait of Hormuz in order to use it to threaten its rivals, and in its practice of taking the Gulf states hostage in every crisis with the United States and Israel. This appears to be an attempt to strengthen its pressure cards after losing Syria, Gaza, and Lebanon as well. Iran had used these areas as a means to impose its geopolitical balance. Here, its control over the strait and the holding hostage of Gulf security would represent a major threat that will force the western Gulf to create a new reality to confront it.

We can expect a “peace” agreement with the United States, most likely one based on an exchange of commitments. Washington’s main demand is that Iran end its nuclear project. In return, Tehran is demanding an American pledge not to attack it. This is the same condition with Israel, which will accept nothing less than getting rid of Hezbollah, thereby ending the Iranian encirclement around it.

It is not unlikely that the negotiators will agree that Iran should pledge not to repeat its aggression against the Gulf states. But that will not prevent Iran from continuing to serve as an indirect geopolitical threat to the Gulf while retaining the weapons of the “strait” and the “proxies.”

There will be no way to compel Tehran to honor its commitments except through counterforce. This will require the Gulf states to move into a new phase of reconciliation and cooperation. Collectively, the Gulf Cooperation Council states possess geographic depth, regional military agreements, and financial power that together amount to more than $4 trillion.

Read more:

Escalation against neighbors, Iran’s strategic miscalculation in the Gulf

The fragile 60-day agreement at a crossroads for US-Iran relations