Houthis are in a rabbit hole

One reader asked: Why don’t the Saudis simply resolve the situation in Yemen and put an end to the Houthis? The truth is that after many long years of following this file, I can say that the Houthi issue resembles a rabbit hole. Every time you think you have reached its core, you discover another layer of tunnels made up of tribal and regional relationships and alliances.

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The initial conclusion may seem simple, but it is realistic: the Houthi movement is a temporary condition. It is a small, armed, tribal, ideological and extremist group, and all similar historical cases suggest that such groups do not last in the end. The Houthis make up less than seven percent of Yemen’s population. Even so, they have managed to weave broad local alliances, and those alliances have been the group’s weakness just as they were once its strength.

Nor is it accurate to compare Yemen’s Houthis, or Ansar Allah, to Lebanon’s Hezbollah, which is larger in number and as a share of the population, and which lives within its Shia and social base in Lebanon, not far from it as the Houthis do in Sanaa. The Houthis are a minority that moved from Saada into Sanaa by exploiting the upheaval of the Arab Spring, then occupied it by force of arms and alliances, and revived imamate rule. The Houthis are not Hezbollah, a group with a political future because it rests on a substantial population base.

There is also the “thorn-like Houthi.” It does not only threaten Saudi Arabia’s stability, it threatens Yemen first. This small Houthi movement has managed to make itself a player whose threat is comparable to Iran’s. It was ahead of others in threatening international trade through the Bab al-Mandab Strait and navigation more broadly in the Red Sea. The armed group also tried to play a role that crossed borders and waters into East Africa. Still, the Houthis remain a small faction that becomes more fragile the larger it grows and the more it expands its hostile activities.

In geopolitical comparisons, the Houthis may be to Saudi Arabia what Cuba was to the United States. Cuba appears to be a small point in America’s neighborhood. The communist island remained a thorn in Washington’s side for decades because of its ties to Moscow. Now Castro’s Cuba is in its final chapter and will soon return to the American fold.

As for how this ant lived and survived next to the American elephant, that was part of the understandings of the Cold War. The United States decided to invade the Cuban island, Moscow’s ally. Although it tried once and failed, the Soviets became convinced that the Americans would not stop. For that reason, Khrushchev offered to withdraw the missiles in exchange for Kennedy’s pledge not to invade the island, which would no longer become a source of threat, and for America to withdraw its missiles from Turkey, the American line of confrontation against Moscow. The two sides agreed, and Cuba remained a compliant communist state, while Turkey remained the Western ally that did not threaten Moscow.

The Houthis and Hezbollah are both proxies of Iran, which uses them as part of its strategy to impose its influence on the countries of the region under familiar propaganda slogans. We do not yet know how Tehran will shape its regional strategy as a result of the current war with the United States and Israel. If the proxy file is not resolved through negotiations, these crisis-hit areas are likely to witness further rounds of confrontation.

At the same time, Yemenis are capable of preoccupying the Houthis, exhausting them, and ultimately ending their project. Today, the group controls only one-third of the territory it held at the peak of its expansion. Its airport is closed, its ports are under blockade, and its leadership is hiding underground. From Iran’s perspective, the Houthis are also a proxy of lower strategic value than the militias in Iraq and Hezbollah. They would be the cheapest card on the table if Tehran decided to bargain in regional deals. That is why I see them as a temporary condition.

The challenge, however, is that the Houthis are not known for political flexibility, unlike Hezbollah, which has previously signed agreements with Israel and responded to calls from its Lebanese rivals during past crises.

The question remains: Is there a way out for Ansar Allah from this hole in which they live, a place that was once a palace and has now become their prison? The political solution remains available: political power-sharing is still on the table and could save the group from destruction. The Houthis remain a Yemeni component. They have the right to be partners in government, not to dominate it. They have been offered participation several times, but they continue to act with arrogance and refuse, out of a desire to seize all power, until the day comes when they lose everything.

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